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Abstract1
Expectations, exerting influence through social norms, are a very strong candidate to explain2
how complex societies function. In the Dictator game (DG), people expect generous behavior3
from others even when they cannot enforce any sharing of the pie. Here we assume that people4
donate following their expectations, and that they update their expectation after playing a DG5
by reinforcement learning to construct a model that explains the main experimental results in6
the DG. Full agreement with the experimental results is reached when some degree of mismatch7
between expectations and donations is added into the model. These results are robust against8
the presence of envious agents, but affected if we introduce selfish agents that do not update9
their expectations. Our results point to social norms being on the basis of the generous behavior10
observed in the DG and also to the wide applicability of reinforcement learning to explain many11
strategic interactions.12
In spite of the many fundamental issues that humanity still faces both at local and global13
scales, human society has proven capable of taking our species to levels of adaptation and success14
unrivaled in the animal world [1]. Research in evolutionary psychology and anthropology suggests15
that human beings are especially social mostly because they are especially cooperative [2, 3]. One16
of the main mechanisms behind such an ultra-cooperative behavior is expectations, that promote17
prosocial behavior through the willingness to fit in the group (to conform to the expectations the18
group has about oneself [4]) and/or to avoid punishment (for not following their expectations [5]).19
According to Bicchieri [6], social norms are indeed governed by both empirical expectations (what20
we believe others will do) and normative expectations (what we believe others believe we will do).21
Thus, expectations which drive behavior become social norms [6] to which most people conform,22
leading to an overall cooperative performance of the society [7, 8]. Social norms can serve to23
choose among different Nash equilibria in social complex environments –games– where individuals24
face strategic interactions [9,10] and drive behavior in non-strategic settings where individuals can25
choose actions depending on their expectations of others and the degree to which these actions are26
seen appropriate [11].27
A particularly well-suited framework to study expectations is the dictator game (DG for short),28
which has provided a large body of experimental evidence on altruistic behaviour in the lab during29
the last thirty years [12, 13]. The DG is a simple one-shot game with two players: the first one30
(the dictator) is invited to divide a specified amount between herself and the second player (the31
recipient). The dictator may divide the pie in the manner she sees fit, while the recipient is not32
permitted to make any claim to the money. Theoretically, self-centered preferences predict that33
the dictator keeps all the pie and the recipient receives nothing; hence, any positive donation34
can be interpreted as proof of generosity. Contrary to the self-centered prediction, Engel’s meta-35
analysis [12] shows that a huge number of individuals do offer nonzero, often sizeable portions of the36
pie to the recipient. On average, subjects donate between 20-30% of the total pie with a non-trivial37
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fraction of subjects choosing an equal split. Interestingly, some authors argue that this is indeed a38
lower bound for generosity given the absence of social context within a lab experiment [13–18].39
Expectations in the DG have been recently studied in a series of experiments that allowed to40
probe the influence of different social factors on the observations [19]. Specifically, we have found41
that even if we elicit expectations from people in different roles, or from external observers of the42
social interaction, or from subjects socially distant because they refer to a previous experimental43
session, or when the money at stake is large, we always find that people expect generous behavior.44
In fact, a majority of people expects a fair split and only about 10% of the subjects predict they45
will receive nothing. On the other hand, people have a behavior that is very correlated with their46
expectations, which supports the role of expectations in the formation of social norms (see also47
Refs. 11,20,21).48
In this paper, we model the formation of people’s expectations in terms of learning from own49
experience, and in particular we focus on expectations in the DG in order to validate our model by50
comparing to the large amount of available experimental evidence. We model behavior by assuming51
that people’s decisions are based on what they expect and on what they observe. Subjects are thus52
endowed with aspirations that reflect what they expect to gain from any interaction. In our setting,53
aspirations of subjects coincide in value with expectations about the donations they will receive54
as recipients; while when acting as dictators, we will posit that their donations are such that they55
keep the money that corresponds to their expectations [see Eq. (4 below)]. The fraction of the pie56
that recipients receive from dictators is compared with their aspiration level; when the donation is57
larger (than expected) then the stimulus is positive and leads to higher aspirations in the future and58
vice versa. This process is called learning. On the other hand, current decisions are “affected” by59
previous interaction with other players. Thus, any donation received by recipients have an influence60
in what they will donate in future; we call this effect habituation or herding. Most importantly in61
our setting, and in absence of noise, donations are bounded by aspirations, in the sense that subjects62
cannot exceed their own aspiration level when making a donation.63
Our model is akin to other theoretical settings in which observed behavior and norms influence64
behavior. The work of Andrighetto et al. [8], for example, develops an agent-based model in which65
contributions to a public good are affected by the norm salience, which is updated upon observing66
the contribution of other members and the past punishment decisions that may include normative67
messages or judgments on whether such contributions are viewed appropriately (see [22,23] for other68
models of social norms and [24, 25] for experiments where subjects can express their disapproval).69
While subjects also learn form past interactions in our model, a key difference between our models70
is that we focus on a non-strategic interaction in which subjects update their expectations about71
generosity and this possibly affects their donations. Hence our paper complements the empirical72
evidence in [11] where generosity seems to be affected by the social norms. Our contribution is73
to show that these norms can emerge as the result of updating expectations and aspirations that74
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affect giving; i.e., we consider a dynamic model of reinforcement learning.75
As we will show, the model summarized above leads to the following results: For any value76
—positive and smaller than one— of the learning and habituation parameters we find that an77
overhelming majority of the players donate about 30% of the pie and, consistently, they expect to78
receive 30% of the pie as well. There is almost no heterogeneity in the donation of dictators; in79
order to quantify this result, we have computed the Gini coefficient [26, 27] to measure the degree80
of diversity in the donations, and found that it is close to 1. Therefore generosity emerges as81
social norm with almost no deviant subjects. It is quite remarkable that the observed average82
practically mimics the average result shown in the meta-analysis of 200 dictator game experiments83
[12]. However, its also important to have in mind that experiments with humans provide certain84
degree of variability of responses. To capture this heterogeneity, we also consider a stochastic85
version of the model where subjects with certain probability do not follow the social norm. While86
small noise does not impact substantially on results (average donation, 〈d〉 = 0.37, Gini coefficient87
of the distribution of donations, G= 0.85) we find that large noise generates a distribution that88
replicates Engel results in both average and heterogeneity (〈d〉 = 0.27; G= 0.71). The results about89
expectations are close to those found in our earlier experimental work [19]. We will also show90
that the results are robust against the existence of envious individuals, but they are very much91
affected by the presence of selfish individuals or free-riders, that never change their expectations92
and, consequently, their behavior.93
Thus, our main message is that learning may explain the emergence and the adherence to a94
social norm in the society, and that this is indeed confirmed by the successful replication of the95
experimental results with human in many different environments. In fact, a necessary condition96
to recover the experimental results is just to let subjects make mistakes and also to be ready to97
learn. In the following sections we introduce our model in detail, present the results supporting98
this conclusions, and close the paper by discussing their implications.99
Methods100
Let us consider N individuals interacting through a game. The game chosen is the Dictator Game101
(DG), a two-players degenerate game where the “dictator” player has to decide how to split an102
endowment Φ between herself and her partner. The recipient is passive and can only accept the103
“donation”. In the model, individuals play DG games iteratively but they change partner (and104
possibly role) every round: Each time step, pairs of individuals are randomly chosen among a105
population of N agents, and roles (dictator D / recipient R) are randomly assigned.106
The update of strategies is performed each time step, after individuals have played one DG. In107
this game, we define strategy as the quantity a dictator is going to donate, i.e., the donation Di of108
player i (in other words, strategies directly determine actions). Instead of using traditional strategy109
4
updating rules such as proportional imitation or Moran-like rules [28], in our model individuals make110
decisions based on experiential induction, i.e. they update their strategies by reinforcement learning.111
To that end, we have developed a modification of the classical Bush-Mosteller (BM) algorithm [29]112
(see also Refs. 30, 31). In our model, only recipients, as a result of the game (dictator decisions),113
update their strategy to be used the next time they play the role of dictator. This intends to114
represent the fact that, after receiving a donation, agents update their expectations taking into115
account how much dictators gave in past games, and then use those expectations to decide on how116
much they themselves donate next time they act as dictators.117
In detail, the algorithm works as follows: As in the original proposal, individuals have an118
aspiration level Ai (their expectations), representing the proportion of the endowment they expect119
to receive when playing as a recipient. Each individual i playing R (recipient) receives a stimuli120
sRi ∈ [−1, 1] as a consequence of her dictator’s decisions. When the difference between the donation121
received (payoff pii) and her aspiration level is positive, recipients receive a positive stimuli, and122
vice versa, according to123
sRi,t =

(pii,t −Ai,t)/(Φ−Ai,t) if Φ 6= Ai,t,
0 if Φ = Ai,t,
(1)
where Φ is the total amount to split among the players.124
The stimuli, if positive, increases the willingness to earn more in the next encounter (meaning:125
“I got more than I expected so I should expect to receive more”), and vice versa, affecting future126
expectations. This effect is moderated by a learning rate l ∈ [0, 1] that balances the contribution127
of past experience. The expression for the change in the aspiration level is then128
ARi,t+1 =

ARi,t + (Φ−ARi,t)lsi,t if sRi,t ≥ 0,
ARi,t +A
R
i,tlsi,t if s
R
i,t < 0.
(2)
Now, as we advanced above, expectations originating from interactions as a recipient govern129
actions when acting as dictator in the following manner: An individual adapts the donation she is130
willing to give when playing as a dictator as a consequence of the donation she just received, incor-131
porating an habituation parameter h ∈ [0, 1] that, similarly to what occurs with the expectations,132
balances between their past donation and the donation received (payoff), as shown in eq. 3.133
DRi,t+1 = (1− h)DRi,t + hpii,t. (3)
Equations (1)–(3) above define the basic dynamics of our model: higher donations lead to higher134
aspirations and also to higher donations. With such a model, however, there is no feedback from135
aspirations to donations and, furthermore, both quantities can take any value in [0,Φ], which is136
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certainly not realistic (practically nobody donates more than Φ/2). Therefore, to prevent these137
problems, we introduce an additional hypothesis in the model: The donation cannot exceed the138
amount resulting from subtracting the aspiration of the individual from the endowment; in other139
words, the amount kept by a dictator after donating is never lower than her aspiration level, which140
is a sensible assumption. In order to ensure this, we introduce the assumption that donations are141
bounded:142
DRi,t+1 = max{0,min[DRi,t+1, (Φ−ARi,t+1)]} (4)
Interestingly, we note that this rule makes learning dependent on Ai, thus coupling donations143
and aspirations as expected. From Eq. (4) it can be seen that high aspirations allow only for small144
increases in donations, where low aspirations allow more freedom for the evolution of donations145
according to Eq. (3). This completes the definition of the deterministic version of our model146
ingredients and their parameterization, and the corresponding dynamics (summarized also in Fig.147
1). Without loss of generality, we will choose Φ = 1 for simplicity hereafter. Next, we present the148
results of our model; the code is available upon request.149
Figure 1: Donations (pii,t) affect the aspiration level of recipients (i.e., their expectations about
generosity) through a leaning process, Eq. (2). Donations influence also what subjects will donate
in future through an habituation process, Eq. (3). In our model, dictators never give more than
what they expect to receive as recipients, thus donations never exceed aspiration levels, Eq. (4).
Results150
Our analysis of the model is based on extensive simulations with N = 1000 individuals. Each151
simulation run is let to evolve through a transient of 10000 time steps, after which we check whether152
an stationary state has been reached, defined by the slope of the averaged donation, measured in a153
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time window of 1000 steps, being inferior to 10−4. If the system has not reached an stationary state,154
we let it evolve for subsequent time windows of 1000 steps. Each combination of model parameters155
has been replicated 100 times and results averaged.156
We explore the space of parameters of the learning algorithm, simulating discrete values for157
l ∈ [0, 1] and h ∈ [0, 1] at intervals of 0.1, but for the shake of simplicity, we will only present158
the results at intervals of 0.2. The endowment is set to Φ = 1. Individual aspirations Ai are159
initialised randomly following a uniform distribution U [0, 1] and initial donations are constrained160
to Di = Φ−Ai, consistently with our model definition. Our aim is to compare the outcomes of our161
model with the experimental results reported in the literature.162
In what follows, we will focus on the general case of the model l ∈ [0.2, 0.8] and h ∈ [0.2, 0.8],163
and we will discuss the limiting cases in the Supplementary Information.164
Deterministic model165
Figure 2 shows the distribution of aspirations and donations (rounded to the nearest tenth) at the166
end of the simulations, averaged over 100 replications, for each combination of parameters l and h.167
7
Figure 2: Final averaged distribution of aspirations and donations. Each subplot presents results
for a combination of learning rate, l, (in increasing order from top to bottom) and habituation
parameter, h, (in increasing order from left to right). Red bars, histograms of aspirations; blue
bars, histograms of donations. Bins labelled n of the histograms count the frequency of donations
with values verifying (n/10) ≤ D < (n+ 1)/10.
The first conclusion we can draw from this figure is that, generically for all values of l and h,168
subjects donate nonzero amounts of money and, furthermore, that practically all subjects offer a169
donation between 30% and 40% of the pie. As for expectations, what we find is that aspiration170
levels in the population are very similar to the observed donations. Interpreting our results on171
expectations in terms of social norms, what we observe a notable level of adherence to such a norm172
since most subjects are giving a very similar fraction of the pie. We never observer subjects behaving173
selfishly (donating zero), and only in a few cases they exhibit fair or hyper-fair behavior (donating174
half or more than half of the endowment). We will give a more quantitative characterization of the175
average parameters of the distributions below.176
These results are in general agreement with the experimental observations in so far as most177
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people behave generously, offering nonzero amounts, and also because the mode of the distribution178
is close to the fair division. Another feature that our model recovers is that aspirations (expectations179
in real life) are strongly correlated with donations, although this is something that is to be expected180
as it is built in our premises (agents donate what they expect to receive). However, comparing these181
findings in more detail to the experimental results [19], we notice that there is a large discrepancy in182
terms of the heterogeneity of the distribution of donations. In our simulations described above we183
find practically all agents at the same level of aspiration and donation, whereas in real life there is a184
much larger variety of donations and aspiration. It is then clear that, while our deterministic model185
seems to be capturing the basics of the behavior in DG, we need to introduce some further ingredient186
in order to reproduce better the empirical results. We address this issue in the following subsection187
by taking into account the fact that subjects may make mistakes, i.e., designing a stochastic version188
of our basic model.189
Stochastic model190
As we have just stated, the main problem with the results of the deterministic model is the lack of191
variability. To try to improve our model in this direction, we introduce imperfect decision making192
(or, as is usually referred to in economics, “trembling hand”), which we implement by adding to193
the donations a noise term as follows:194
DRi,t+1 = (1 + ε)D
R
i,t+1, (5)
where ε is drawn from a normal distribution N(0, δ). In terms of the DG context, this represents195
the fact that, when making a decision on a donation, people may correct their expectations because196
they feel that their experience is leading them to overestimate or underestimate the donation arising197
from the social norm. Alternatively, another reason for such a term is that people may simply feel198
more or less generous at a given time (realization of the DG) for idiosyncratic reasons. Finally, we199
could see the noise term as a kind of ”rounding” of the values obtained from the update procedure.200
In any event, we want to stress that this is not the same as learning in so far as depending on201
the noise the correction of the decision can go against or in favor of the direction marked by the202
stimulus at each update. An implication of the introduction of noise is that now donations are203
not slaved to aspirations, and therefore if they still match it would be an additional feature of the204
experiments that we are reproducing. We will now check whether this new ingredient leads to a205
distribution of donations less peaked which would be closer to the empirical distributions.206
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Figure 3: Final averaged distribution of aspirations and donations for ε = 0.01. Each subplot
presents results for a combination of learning rate, l, (in increasing order from top to bottom) and
habituation parameter, h, (in increasing order from left to right). Red bars, histograms of aspira-
tions; blue bars, histograms of donations. Bins labelled n of the histograms count the frequency of
donations with values verifying (n/10) ≤ D < (n + 1)/10. Error bars correspond to the standard
deviation arising from averaging over 100 realizations.
Figures 3 and 4 present the results for this stochastic version of the model and, as before, we207
will discuss the general case of the model (h 6= {0, 1} and l 6= {0, 1}). We will first describe our208
results when the trembling hand effect is very weak, which we represent by choosing ε = 0.01.209
The corresponding final distributions of aspirations and donations, averaged over 100 realizations,210
are shown in Fig. 3. It can be seen in the majority of the parameter space (0.2 ≤ h ≤ 0.8 and211
0.2 ≤ l ≤ 0.8; limiting cases show different behavior, see Supplementary Information) that donations212
and aspirations have converged to the same distribution of values in each scenario, with almost all213
distributions being very sharp, where agents donate and expect to receive between 30% and 40% of214
the endowment, which is consistent with the average donation found in experiments and also close215
to the ”grand mean” found in the meta study by Engel [12]. However, the results are still very216
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similar to the ones in the general case with no trembling hand (Fig. 2) where the distributions of217
donations are also peaked and have a mean around the 30% of the endowment. The only minor218
differences with the deterministic case arise for low values of l and low to moderate values of h,219
but even then the donations are basically restricted to two intervals. On the other hand, the very220
small error bars in our bins indicate that all realizations give approximately the same results, which221
implies that we are in fact not very far from the deterministic model. As with the deterministic222
model, we will describe more quantitatively the average parameters of the distributions below.223
Figure 4: Final averaged distribution of aspirations and donations for ε = 0.1. Each subplot presents
results for a combination of learning rate, l, (in increasing order from top to bottom) and habituation
parameter, h, (in increasing order from left to right). Red bars, histograms of aspirations; blue bars,
histograms of donations. Bins labelled n of the histograms count the frequency of donations with
values verifying (n/10) ≤ D < (n+ 1)/10. Error bars correspond to the standard deviation arising
from averaging over 100 realizations.
When we increase the noise component to ε = 0.1 and allow the agents to take more imperfect or224
inaccurate decisions, results are shown in Fig 4. As advanced above, here we observe distributions225
widening as noise increases, opposite to the outcome of the limiting cases (see Supplementary226
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Information). It is remarkable that in a large range of the parameter space simulations yield227
distributions of donations quite close to the ones found in experimental results (cf. Ref. 19). On the228
other hand, while expectations are still governing the choice of the donated amounts, the correlation229
is now not exact, also in agreement with the observations from the experiments. In fact, donations230
are somewhat more spread out than expectations, as was to be expected from the way we introduce231
the noise in the model. In this case, the results for large habituation, h = 0.8, are the ones that232
reproduce better the experimental results, as they have a small but clearly observable fraction of the233
population that behaves selfishly, donating nothing. We thus see that our model, when it includes a234
not so small amount of randomness, reproduces all the main experimental features. In this regard,235
it is important to point out that other choices for ε ∈ [0.05, 0.2] lead to similar histograms, and236
only when the noise dominates the decisions the model ceases to be a good description of the237
observations.238
Model extensions239
In search for more general results, we now consider two additional extensions of the model. First,240
we look at the effects of having subjects with envious preferences; second, we introduce free-riders241
in the society, i.e., subjects who always choose to donate zero and never change their strategy. We242
discuss these two cases separately in the rest of this section. Fig. 5 summarizes the comparison of243
our results above with the two additional variants.244
Envious individuals and disadvantegeous inequality245
This case intends to represent envious or inequality-averse individuals that would never share more246
than the half of the pie [32] since they are averse to disadvantegeous distributions. According to247
this, we impose that donations can never be larger than 50% of the pie (in the limit Di = Ai), this248
bound reflecting disadvantegeous inequity-aversion.249
DRi,t+1 = min(D
R
i,t+1, 0.5) (6)
We fix the probability of being inequity-averse, in other words, of behaving as indicated by (eq.250
6), to be 0.05, but other percentages of the population lead to very similar behavior. As shown in251
Fig. 5 C and D, the results are very similar to the general case without restrictions: A (deterministic252
model) and B (stochastic model with ε = 0.10). However, comparing panels A with C and B with253
D, we do observe that the whole distribution is skewed to the left, indicating that the whole society254
becomes somewhat more selfish. This is not unexpected because there are only a few instances in255
which donations are larger than half of the pie, and therefore the constraint we have just imposed256
yields minor modifications of the general behavior.257
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Figure 5: Final averaged distribution of aspirations and donations over all parameters in the general
regime. A: deterministic model, donations 〈d〉 = 0.37; G= 0.85. B: stochastic model with ε = 0.1,
donations 〈d〉 = 0.27; G= 0.71. These two panels are in fact an average of those in Figs. 1 and 3. C:
disadvantegous inequality with ε = 0, donations 〈d〉 = 0.36; G= 0.90. D: disadvantegous inequality
with ε = 0.1, donations 〈d〉 = 0.25; G= 0.73. E: one free rider, ε = 0, donations 〈d〉 = 0.06;
G= 0.87. F: one free rider, ε = 0.1, donations 〈d〉 = 0.06; G= 0.86.
Existence of free-riders258
As a second test of the generality of our results, we add free riders —subjects who always donate259
zero— to our population. Actually, the novel ingredient is not that there are selfish individuals:260
as we always initialize our simulations randomly, there are some selfish individuals in the previous261
results. What we are doing now is to generate a separate fraction of the initial population whose262
donation is zero, and choose the donations of the rest from a uniform distribution as before. The263
key point here is that the indviduals that have been specifically selected to donate zero never update264
their donation according to their expectations or, in other words, they do not follow any social norm265
based on them. This amounts to saying that they are not only free-riders, but obstinate free-riders.266
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Our results in this respect are quite dramatic (see Fig. 5 E and F): We find that the introduction267
of one single free-riding is enough to destroy the social norm since every single player become selfish.268
This is true for most combinations of parameters, except for low habituation parameter (not shown).269
Even then, the histogram is largely skewed towards zero donations. The social norm changes from270
being generous to be completely selfish since all players end up donating zero (and expecting zero).271
In the case of low values of habituation, subjects are less influenced by the interaction with the272
free-rider, and are able to maintain positive (but small) expectations and donations. It is also273
important to note that once a social norm is sufficiently widespread, subjects do not change their274
behaviour easily, and that is what makes the low habituation distribution less selfish. In any275
event, as we anticipated, the key mechanism here is that these special free riders refuse to adapt276
their expectations irrespective of their interactions, and are therefore actively counteracting the277
establishment of a social norm. This finding supports the view that expectations are fragile, in so278
far as they need to be constantly confirmed in order to allow subjects to accurately predict the279
action of others. Observing individuals that constantly go against the norm, like the free-riders we280
are introducing here, has the effect of making those expectations feeble and unreliable.Interestingly,281
if subjects that never update their donations have positive values for them, they have a similar282
capacity to attract the behavior of the rest, showing that what is important is the fact that some283
people do not follow the norm and not in which direction they go against it. Therefore, learning of284
all agents arises as a key ingredient to support generosity by avoiding the existence of impenitent285
free-riders.286
Discussion287
In this work we presented a very simple model that explains how people behave in dictator games by288
introducing the idea that donations are driven from expectations. This mechanism works affecting289
both our donations, which are modified to be closer to the ones we receive, and our expectations,290
which also reflect the amounts we actually receive. In turn, expectations affect donations by impos-291
ing an upper bound on the amounts we are willing to donate, leading to a coupled evolution of both292
parameters. With these simple and quite natural assumptions, the model predicts that people will293
donate sizable amounts of the pie in the stationary regime, while at the same time by construction294
their expectations will be aligned with their donations. These two results are in excellent agreement295
with experimental observations [12, 19]. Notwithstanding, we have also found that to recover the296
diversity of behaviors arising from the experiments we need to introduce some level of noise, or297
subjects whose hands tremble when they have to decide. When donations are allowed to deviate298
from expectations between a 5% and a 20%, the corresponding stochastic model predictions are299
very closely aligned with real behaviors. This in turn makes the connection between expectations300
and donations less perfect, which is also in good agreement with the observations.301
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Our model is based on a reinforcement learning dynamics, in which the payoff of an action302
constitutes a stimulus which agents subsequently use to update their strategies (which, in this303
specific paper, coincide with their actions). The success of this dynamics in explaining the results304
of different experiments beyond the current one, namely Prisoner’s Dilemma [33] or Public Good305
games [34, 35] suggests that this type of learning is indeed used by us in many situations. In fact,306
in Ref. 33 it was shown that reinforcement learning was the only rule (among quite a few that307
have been used in evolutionary models, see Ref. 28 for a description of those) that gave rise to a308
behavior known as moody conditional cooperation (the probability of cooperation is larger when309
others cooperated and also depends on the subject’s previous choice of cooperation or defection). In310
addition, reinforcement learning can in fact be a proximate mechanism to explain moody conditional311
cooperation [35], as it allows to directly reproduce the experimental results. On the other hand,312
in terms of the interpretation of reinforcement learning, our two parameters have a clear bearing313
on actual behavior: The habituation parameter h is akin to herding (albeit it can also be thought314
as normative conformity), implying that when h is low h agents do not care much about what315
other people do when they make their own decisions. The learning rate l reflects how subjects316
adapt their expectations to the real environment, with low or high values corresponding to similar317
adaptability of the agent. While some studies highlight the benefits of these aspects in information318
acquisition [36, 37], the fact that our model produces quantitatively correct results as compared319
with the experiments in [19] for most parameters, but not if one of them is absent or too influential320
tells us that both processes are also important to reconcile with experimental findings on generosity.321
Another interesting point that our research raises touches upon the relation between social322
norms, behavior and expectations. In the framework introduced by Bicchieri [6] and discussed323
in the Introduction of social norms as a combination of empirical and normative expectations, in324
this paper we are confined to the domain of empirical expectations, but our model is certainly325
suggestive of a social norm actually driving people’s donations in DG experiments. In fact, we326
believe that the accuracy of our model and its connection to actual social norms can be further327
tested by additional experiments, in which the normative expectations of the players could also328
be measured [38]. If normative expectations would coincide with the empirical expectations (as329
measured in [19] and as explained by our model), we would have shown that we are indeed in330
the presence of a true social norm. Such an experimental confirmation would clearly establish331
that a population with a very diverse range of expectations, with agents evolving according to the332
reinforcement learning paradigm, ends up converging to a commonly shared social norm of generous333
behavior. This is a promising result and it opens the door to try to look for further models involving334
social norms in other contexts. At the same time, our result that generous behavior is robust against335
individuals averse to disadvantageous inequity, but fragile when individuals do not learn (do not336
update their expectations or do not follow their expectations) means that, first, some degree of337
social influence may be desirable, and second, violation of social norms must not be tolerated if the338
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good behavior is to be preserved. This conclusion is certainly not new, but it is further evidence339
supporting the need for some type of punishment or sanctions to avoid free-riding arising from a340
different evolutionary model such as reinforcement learning. Our results are thus aligned with the341
work of Bendor and Swistak on the evolution of norms (see [23] and references therein), where342
they show that social norms arise from evolutionary game theory considerations under boundedly343
rational behavior. Clearly, the introduction of mechanisms like ostracism [39] or punishment [40],344
possibly incorporating reputation [41] is a good candidate to solve or at least alleviate this problem,345
and that would indeed be the case in our model (removed agentes cannot alter the remaining ones’346
expectations). Alternatively, direct action on the norm by communication among agents as proposed347
in [8] can serve to induce generosity while at the same time avoiding sanctions. The fact that most348
people expect generosity [19] may then be indeed a consequence of this type of mechanisms having349
been in action through history.350
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